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# **1. SOVIET DIPLOMAT HINTS AT RELEASE OF GERMAN PRISONERS**

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[REDACTED] The first secretary of the Soviet embassy in London asked a West German diplomat on 22 August, in a conversation arranged on Soviet initiative, whether the West German attitude toward the USSR would become more friendly if Moscow should agree to return a small number of German prisoners "as a kind of first installment" before Adenauer's trip to Moscow.

The Soviet diplomat also said that if West Germany persisted in its NATO membership, unification would not come "before three years." He would not elucidate further. The Soviet and West German representatives agreed to hold informal meetings at infrequent intervals.

## **Comment**

It is probable that the USSR is preparing to release some of the German prisoners of war, now estimated at 17,000. Soviet ambassador Vinogradov recently assured the West German and Greek ambassadors in Paris that the return of the prisoners should present no particular problem. Moscow, however, appears to want the East German regime to share the credit for securing their release. Khrushchev and Bulganin discussed this question with East German leaders in July after the Geneva conference.

The vague reference to the possibility of reunification after three years was probably designed to encourage the belief among some West German diplomats that private, bilateral talks with the Soviet government offer the best prospects for finding a new path toward reunification. Such talks would probably heighten the belief in Bonn that the West German arms build-up can be slowed because the threat of Soviet aggression is abating.

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## **2. STOPPAGE OF SOVIET PETROLEUM SUPPLIES TO AFGHANISTAN**

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The American embassy in Kabul reported on 22 August that promised shipments of badly needed petroleum supplies are being held up by the **USSR**.

Increasing evidence of acute shortages of oil products in Afghanistan tend to confirm previous reports to this effect.

### **Comment**

It is not known why the **USSR** would take a step which appears to be contrary to its current policy of friendship toward Afghanistan and which might force Afghanistan to accept a settlement with Pakistan. It is possible that the delay is merely a result of transportation difficulties.

If much-publicized emergency shipments from the **USSR** are not forthcoming to counter the Pakistani blockade which caused the shortages, Afghanistan's position in the dispute with Pakistan will be weakened.

### 3. COMMENT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND GOA

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[REDACTED] The Indian government, having deliberately created the psychological atmosphere which led to the widespread riots following the Indian march of 15 August on Goa, now faces the problem of cooling off popular emotions.

With diplomatic relations with Portugal already broken, Nehru has almost exhausted the "peaceful" measures he can take without further inflaming Indian public opinion. Since he is opposed to the use of force and apparently believes the time is not ripe for an intensive effort to take Goa with overwhelming numbers of "peaceful" marchers, his only alternative seems to be to produce a situation of relative quiet in India without abandoning the basic principle of "Goa for the Indians."

The Indian press has already been partially muzzled and there is little doubt that Nehru can control the size and extent of further marches and agitation if he desires to do so. Communist and Socialist criticism of the prime minister's "soft" policy toward Portugal is, however, a continuing source of embarrassment.

It therefore appears likely that the Goan situation will now become relatively quiet and remain so until such time as Nehru feels himself in a strong enough position to permit, but also to control, further agitation. [REDACTED]

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